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THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND’S IMPERILED PRIORITY
MELISSA BOUDREAU & MITU GULATI
“[T]he I.M.F.’s status as a preferred creditor—meaning its loans get
paid back before those of any other lender—is perhaps global finance’s
1
most sacred writ.”
INTRODUCTION
In March 2012, Greece executed the largest sovereign debt
2
restructuring in history. The restructuring asked holders of
government bonds to take a significant haircut, and because a
supermajority of creditors agreed, all creditors were bound under the
bonds’ collective action clause. That is, all creditors except for Official
Sector institutions, such as the European Central Bank and the
European Investment Bank. These institutions claimed priority for
their holdings of Greek bonds over the private sector’s holdings of the
3
same types of bonds. This claim to priority by Official Sector
institutions was not new; because the role of Official Sector
institutions as lenders in crisis situations has evolved into something
akin to a lender of last resort, such de facto priority had become
4
commonplace.
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1. Landon Thomas, Jr., IMF Shifts Its Approach to Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/27/business/international/imf-plan-for-next-crisis-would-splitthe-bill.html?pagewanted=all.
2. For details, see generally Jeromin Zettelmeyer et al., The Greek Debt Restructuring:
An Autopsy, 28 ECON. POL’Y 513 (2013).
3. See Felix Salmon, Greece’s Default Gets Messier, REUTERS (Feb. 28, 2012),
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/02/28/greeces-default-gets-messier/ (discussing claims
of priority over holdings of Greek bonds).
4. For discussions of the IMF’s role as a lender of last resort, see, e.g., Michael Mussa,
Reflections on the Function and Facilities of IMF Lending, in REFORMING THE IMF FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 413, 422–23 (Edwin M. Truman ed., 2006); Charles W. Calomiris, The IMF‘s
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Fast-forward to late October 2012. Up on appeal at the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in New York was the case of NML Capital,
5
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina. The case pitted a U.S. hedge fund
holding defaulted Argentine debt from a decade prior against the
Republic. At issue was the meaning of a standard provision in the
defaulted debt instruments, something called the pari passu clause
(pari passu means “in equal step” in Latin). The hedge fund, NML
Capital (NML), was arguing that the presence of that clause meant
that Argentina could not preferentially pay some creditors while
6
ignoring the claims of others. Further, NML wanted the court to
threaten to impose sanctions on any and all who might assist in
7
violation of the clause. The Second Circuit, for the most part, was
persuaded. It fully agreed with NML on the interpretation of the
clause and it mostly agreed with them about the enforcement
8
mechanism. Because the United States Supreme Court declined to
hear the case in June 2014, the Second Circuit’s decision will stand for
9
the foreseeable future.
The 800-pound gorilla in the corner throughout the litigation was
the implications for Official Sector lending, particularly with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). A key element of Argentina’s
argument was that if the court sided with NML—interpreting pari
passu to mean that all unsecured creditors had to be paid
proportionally—its ruling would be inconsistent with the IMF’s long10
accepted de facto priority as a lender. Therefore, Argentina
Imprudent Role as Lender of Last Resort, 17 CATO J. 275 (1998); Giancarlo Corsetti, Bernardo
Guimarães, & Nouriel Roubini, International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A
Model of IMF's Catalytic Finance, 53 J. MONETARY ECON. 441 (2006).
5. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 201 (2013).
6. Id. at 253–54.
7. Id. at 255.
8. Id. at 254–56; see, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Contract Hope and Sovereign Redemption, 8
CAP. MKTS. L.J. 132 (2013); Theresa A. Monteleone, A Vulture’s Gamble: High-Stakes
Interpretation of Sovereign Debt Contracts in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 8
CAP. MKTS. L.J. 149 (2013); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina,
8 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 123 (2013); see also Joseph Cotterill, Sovereign Pari Passu and the Litigators
of the Lost Cause, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 10 (2014).
9. See Adam Liptak, Argentina’s Debt Appeal Is Rejected by Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES,
June 16, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/16/supreme-court-denies-appeal-byargentina/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
10. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 43, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699
F.3d 246 (2012), (No. 12-105-cv(L)), 2012 WL 1077763 at *43 (“Without [preferred creditor
status for the Official Sector], these lenders would be unable to safeguard countries on the brink
of crisis, which would not only force more countries into default, but also serve to destabilize the
international financial system as a whole.”).
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contended, that interpretation surely had to be wrong. Yet NML was
clever enough to recognize that this was going to be a stumbling block
for them and stipulated in its brief that, of course, it had no interest in
going after IMF funds (which was not a major concession, considering
12
Argentina had paid off all its IMF obligations a long while ago). The
Second Circuit took the path afforded to it by NML and punted on
the issue, saying that the question of Official Sector priority was not
before the court and, in any event, the creditors had made clear that
they were not after payments that were due to organizations such as
13
the IMF.
Pandora’s Box, however, was now open. As a logical matter, if the
IMF or some other multilateral lender such as the World Bank, was
an unsecured creditor without any de jure preferred creditor status,
payments to it in all future cases were now open to attack under the
14
same theory that NML had used against other creditors. As the New
York Times has noted, “[i]t is at least possible that the Second Circuit
opinion could, in the future, be used to keep the [IMF] from having a
preferential standing over the holdouts in any restructuring that did
15
occur.” Indeed, maybe even some past payments were vulnerable,
assuming that statute-of-limitations and immunity complications
could be overcome.

11. Multiple commentators have also made this point with respect to the pari passu
interpretation being advanced by NML. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah Pam, The Pari
Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869 (2004).
12. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
13. See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 260 (“We are not called upon to decide whether policies
favoring preferential payments to multilateral organizations like the IMF would breach pari
passu clauses like the one at issue here. Indeed, plaintiffs . . . contend that ‘a sovereign’s de jure
or de facto policy of subordinating obligations to commercial unsecured creditors beneath
obligations to multilateral institutions like the IMF would not violate the Equal Treatment
Provision for the simple reason that commercial creditors never were nor could be on equal
footing with the multilateral organizations.’”) (citations omitted).
14. See ANNA GELPERN, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L. ECON, POLICY BRIEF: SOVEREIGN
DAMAGE CONTROL 10 (2013) (noting that NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina has put
the
IMF’s
“super
priority”
over
other
lenders
at
risk),
available
at
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb13-12.pdf; LEE C. BUCHHEIT ET AL., THE BROOKINGS
INST.,
REVISITING
SOVEREIGN
BANKRUPTCY
(2013),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/10/sovereign-debt; ALLEN & OVERY, LLP,
THE PARI PASSU CLAUSE AND THE ARGENTINE CASE 10 (2012), available at
http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/The%20pari%20passu%20clause%20and
%20the%20Argentine%20case.pdf.
15. Floyd Norris, Ruling on Argentina Gives Investors an Upper Hand, N.Y. TIMES, June
19,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/business/economy/ruling-on-argentina-givesinvestors-an-upper-hand.html.
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In short, the de facto priority status of Official Sector institutions
is no longer secure. This brings front and center the question of
whether, if attacked, a multilateral financing organization like the
IMF could defend itself by saying that its longstanding de facto
priority status has, as a matter of customary international law (CIL),
evolved to de jure status.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS INTO CUSTOMARY
LAW
The threshold question is: When and how does a norm evolve into
law? Over the years, courts have established numerous norms that
16
have evolved into international law. Given this jurisprudence, one
might imagine that the answer to the threshold “when and how”
17
question would be clear. This is not the case.
A. The Textbook Definition
The textbooks set forth a two-part test to be applied to historical
evidence to determine whether CIL can be said to have emerged. CIL
exists when there is evidence of: “(1) a relatively uniform and
consistent state practice regarding a particular matter; and (2) a belief
18
among states that such practice is legally compelled.” Or, to use a
different phrasing, CIL “results from a general and consistent practice
19
of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.” This
sense of legal obligation is also referred to as opinio juris.
There are significant practical difficulties in implementing this
textbook definition. First, while the authorities seem to agree that
there needs to be lots of state practice to satisfy Step One of the
16. See infra Part IV.
17. For a historical treatment that shows that this murkiness has existed for a long while,
see Ernest Young & Emily Kadens, How Customary is Customary International Law?, 54 WM &
MARY L. REV. 885 (2013).
18. SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 92–93 (2d ed. 2012)
(“[S]tates through their practice, and international lawyers through writings and judicial
decisions, have agreed that customary international law exists whenever two key requirements
are met: (1) a relatively uniform and consistent state practice regarding a particular matter; and
(2) a belief among states that such practice is legally compelled.”).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 102(2) (1987). Much quoted in the literature are pieces of language from a set of classic
International Court of Justice (ICJ) cases. Those include the ICJ’s North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 77, stating that for a practice to amount to CIL,
the practice must be “settled” and ICJ’s Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, ¶ 111, stating that the presence of opinio juris can be
tested based on the analysis of a “sufficiently extensive and convincing practice.”
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definition, the terms they use to describe the quantum of state
practice required are all rather vague. These are terms such as
“uniform and consistent,” “settled,” “extensive,” or “virtually
uniform.” As best we can tell, there is no authoritative source that
translates what those terms mean regarding how much practice there
must be, either with respect to the number of states engaged in the
20
practice or for how long they needed to have been engaging in it.
Even more perplexing to international law scholars is the opinio
juris conundrum. The second step of the textbook definition requires
evidence that the states actually believe that the particular practice
identified in step one is legally compelled. As a threshold matter,
there is the question of how one ever determines what a state—a legal
fiction—believes. But assuming one clears that hurdle, step two poses
a chronological puzzle. For a practice to become law, states have to
engage in it thinking that it is already law. But how can states think
21
that it is law if it is not already law?
The scenario is impossible unless one believes that a large fraction
of states are systematically mistaken about the law over long periods
22
of time. Further, that state of misbelief is directly at odds with the
requirement in step one that the norm in question be well-established
and widely followed—after all, the norms that are most likely to be
well-established and widely followed are the ones that everyone is
clear on, not the ones that key actors are mistaken about. Finally, it is
not clear why the international system would want to elevate to
binding status only those norms that international actors are mistaken
about.

20. E.g., CURTIS F.J. DOEBBLER, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 33 (2006) (“Just how large a number of states are necessary to create a rule of customary
international law is not settled”). For a wonderfully vague attempt to translate the definition of
CIL into the quantum of evidence required, see Herman Meijers, How Is International Law
Made?, 9 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 5 (1978).
21. For discussions of the chronological paradox, see, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The
Chronological Paradox, State Preferences and Opinio Juris (June 1, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://law.duke.edu/cicl/pdf/opiniojuris/panel_1-bradleythe_chronological_paradox,_state_preferences,_and_opinio_juris.pdf; Olufemi Elias, The
Nature of the Subjective Element in Customary International Law, 44 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 501,
504 (1995); Raphael M. Walden, The Subjective Element in the Formation of Customary
International Law, 12 ISR. L. REV. 344, 363 (1977).
22. See Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939, 957 (2005)
(“[C]ustomary international law is thought to be altered by acts that initially constitute
violations of old rules; that is how it changes.”).
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As Curtis Bradley has asked: Would states really want the law
governing their practices to arise solely out of the mistaken beliefs of
their brethren? Is the evolution of law to be decided by those states
least knowledgeable about the law and, therefore, most likely to make
23
systematic mistakes over the long term? The answer to Bradley’s
question surely must be no. At bottom, we have a situation where it is
neither clear how one would go about finding evidence of the
mythical opinio juris, nor is it clear that the international system
24
should want to.
B. The Textbook Definition in Practice
Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate the internal inconsistencies of
the textbook definition of CIL is to provide an example. For purposes
of the discussion that follows, we will focus on the IMF since it is the
primary provider of emergency assistance in the international
financial system today. The initial question concerns the IMF’s
position as a de facto preferred creditor when it lends to sovereigns in
distress. How well-established is this norm?
Our canvassing of the extensive literature on the IMF suggests
that this norm of de facto priority for IMF lending is as wellestablished as just about any international norm can possibly be.
There is extensive discussion of how the norm is widely accepted by
the international community and has been so since roughly the 1970s,
25
if not longer. For example, in 2010 when the European Stabilization
Mechanism specified that its lending to distressed euro-area
sovereigns would be on a priority basis, care was taken to specify that
26
that priority would be secondary to the priority due to the IMF.
23. See Bradley, supra note 21.
24. Cf. J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L.
449, 475 (2000) (“[T]here is no methodology that has the capacity to determine whether states
have, in fact, accepted a norm as law.”).
25. E.g., LEONIE F. GUDER, THE ADMINISTRATION OF DEBT RELIEF BY INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: A LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE HIPIC INITIATIVE 50 (2008);
Bessma Momami, Internal or External Norm Champions: The IMF and Multilateral Debt Relief,
in OWNING DEVELOPMENT: CREATING POLICY NORMS IN THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK 34
(Susan Park & Antje Vetterlein eds. 2010); LEX REIFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT:
THE CASE FOR AD HOC MACHINERY 66 (2003); Ashoka Mody, A New Greek Test for Europe,
PROJECT SYNDICATE (Sep. 16, 2013), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/theongoing-consequences-of-the-greek-crisis-by-ashoka-mody (noting the IMF’s “implicit status as
a ‘senior’ creditor”).
26. Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The EU Architecture to Avert a Sovereign Debt Crisis, 2011
OECD J., no. 2, at 1, 14, available at http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/49191980.pdf
(“It is worth stressing that the IMF priority is not established anywhere and acts de facto, the
Treaty is the first formal official document where it has been acknowledged.”),
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More importantly, there is no disagreement, even from critics of the
IMF and its claims to preferred creditor status, that such a norm exists
27
and is widely accepted among nations. Further, there is the reality
that the IMF has, over scores of sovereign crises over the past several
28
decades, always gotten paid back on a preferred basis. Even NML,
the hedge fund fighting for its equal payment rights from Argentina,
acknowledged—and, in fact, assumed—the official sector’s superior
status. In its brief to the Second Circuit NML commented,
“Multilateral organizations’ preferred status among creditors follows
from the unique role those organizations play in sovereign finance as
lenders of last resort . . . . The Equal Treatment Provision requires
equal treatment of similar commercial creditors; it does not require
29
that creditors with differing priority be treated equally.” At bottom
then, there is extensive evidence that the IMF’s preferred creditor
status has been widely accepted over a long period of time as an
international norm and there is no evidence pushing in the other
direction.
Were that evidence not persuasive enough, there is the fact that
the institution itself is a subset of the international community. There
are roughly 200 states in the world of which more than 90 percent are
members of the IMF. When the IMF demands or receives preferred
creditor status (which it always does), it is effectively acting on behalf
of its member-shareholders. That means that we can safely say that
over 90 percent of the nations in the world regularly cooperate in
following the norm of granting the IMF preferred-creditor status. All
in all, the evidence is such that it should easily satisfy the first prong
of the two-part test for CIL evolution, regardless of how narrowly the
27. Kunibert Raffer, Preferred or Not Preferred: Thoughts on Priority Structures of
Creditors
2
(October
16,
2009)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://homepage.univie.ac.at/kunibert.raffer/ila-wash.pdf, (noting that “all other creditors are
supposed to take haircuts first. Only if this would still be considered insufficient by the Bretton
Woods Institutions (BWIs), their own and other IFIs’ claims can be touched”). Recently, Raffer
further defended his view by taking the “Yes” position in a written debate with Cleary Gottlieb
Steen & Hamilton partner Andrew Shutter concerning whether official sector debt should be
subordinate to that of the private sector. Head to Head: In the Case of Sovereigns, Should
Official Sector Debt be Subordinated to Private Sector Debt?, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (July 10, 2013),
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3228952/Head-to-head-In-the-case-of-sovereigns-should-officialsector-debt-be-subordinated-to-private-sector.html. In that debate, Raffer again conceded that
the IMF has traditionally enjoyed de facto priority status. See id. (“[P]reference has been an
unfortunate routine for decades. The IMF and other multilateral lenders have been able to
secure de facto creditor treatment . . . .”).
28. See Mussa, supra note 4, at 421.
29. Corrected Joint Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 39–40, NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2012), (No. 12-105(L)), 2012 WL 1494918 at *39–40.
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definition is read.
Yet even with step one of the CIL definition established to a nearcertainty, step two poses problems for the IMF. It is widely accepted
that the preferred priority of the IMF is agreed in practice but not
30
legally compelled. This is precisely the opposite of what step two of
the textbook definition requires. Further, Official Sector institutions
themselves discount their “legal” status as preferred creditors. In
other words, they accurately recognize the reality that their preferred
creditor status is a function of long standing norms and not any
formal legal dictate. For example, the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) has a webpage dedicated to explaining the
institution’s preferred creditor status and noting its value to distressed
sovereigns. It begins with a clear statement of its status: “As a
multilateral development institution, IFC enjoys a de facto Preferred
31
Creditor Status.” Yet, the IFC then goes on to comment that the
nature of its priority is found only in custom; just a few lines after it
boldly declares its de facto priority the IFC notes, “As is the case for
the World Bank and other multilateral development institutions,
Preferred Creditor Status is not a legal status, but is embodied in
practice, and is granted by the shareholders of IFC (over 180 member
32
governments).” It would be difficult to craft a clearer statement
disclaiming opinio juris and thus concede step two of the traditional
test for CIL.
Because Official Sector institutions fail to meet the traditional test
for CIL, it is tempting to conclude at this point that no court could
possibly find that the IMF has de jure preferred creditor status. The
problem with reaching that conclusion, though, is that surely this same
state of affairs—the near impossibility of finding evidence of opinio
juris—has existed with every prior norm that a court ever decided had
evolved into CIL. Put differently, even though the traditional CIL
30. Susan Schadler, The IMF’s preferred creditor status: Questions after the Eurozone crisis,
VOX (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.voxeu.org/article/imf-preferred-creditor-status-and-eurozonecrisis.
FIN.
CORP.,
31. Preferred
Creditor
Status,
INT’L
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/IFC+S
yndications/Overview_Benefits_Structure/Syndications/Preferred+Creditor+Status (last visited
May 30, 2014).
32. Id. (emphasis added). See also REBECCA M. NELSON ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV.,
R41239, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT IMF INVOLVEMENT IN THE EUROZONE
DEBT CRISIS 4 (2010) (“The IMF, like the other international financial institutions, enjoys a de
facto preferred creditor status; member governments grant priority to repayment of their
obligations to the IMF over other creditors.”).
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doctrine seems to raise insurmountable barriers to those seeking to
transform custom into law, courts still manage to discover CIL. How?
C. A Different Understanding of CIL
We are not the first to recognize the difficulties in confronting the
circularity of the textbook definition of CIL—far from it. We have
guidance from a subset of international law scholars who have
wrestled with the same opinio juris conundrum. These scholars
suggest that if opinio juris is understood as capturing a sense of what
states would find, in a hypothetical bargain sense, as a normatively
attractive rule that improves the common interest of the international
collective, then the two-part definition can work. In other words,
under this view, the “sense of legal obligation” in opinio juris is what
33
states believe the law should be rather than what they believe it is.
Courts determining CIL under this conception would, in effect, be
engaging in a form of common law adjudication.
The commentators who suggest this possibility do not, for the
34
most part, make empirical claims regarding what courts actually do.
Their points are generally more normative—about what courts should
be doing. Below, we attempt to determine what courts actually do
when they confront evolving international norms. By deconstructing
court analyses, we hope to uncover a more sensible understanding of
the CIL doctrine.
II. HOW DO COURTS FIND CIL?
Our question is simple: how do courts apply the dictates regarding
the requirements for finding that a norm has evolved into CIL? What
we know from the commentary and plain logic is that courts do often
look at the past practices of states to determine the first prong of the

33. Bradley, supra note 21 (articulating this “state preferences” view); see also BRIAN D.
LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL
APPLICATIONS 97–98 (2010) (arguing that “opinio juris be interpreted as a requirement that
states generally believe that it is desirable now or in the near future to have an authoritative
legal principle or rule prescribing, permitting, or prohibiting certain state conduct”); Raphael M.
Walden, Customary International Law: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 13 ISR. L. REV. 86, 97 (1978)
(noting that “what is involved may be, not a belief that the practice is already legally binding,
but a claim that it ought to be legally binding”).
34. There is language in some ICJ cases that might be seen as supporting this perspective,
but these bits and pieces of language do not add up to a consistent theme. See, e.g., Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 36, ¶ 70 (July 8)
(suggesting that the normative character of a rule helps determine whether it satisfies the
conditions for being opinio juris).
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traditional definition of CIL—evidence of past practices. But, given
that prong one is easily satisfied, it is the second prong that concerns
us: the opinio juris bit of the equation. In theory, then, the best
approach would be to code the various court decisions for the
evidence that courts examine on the second prong alone.
Unfortunately, we realized when we began our coding that the court
decisions were not going to cooperate. Courts in this area, it turns out,
do not neatly separate out the evidence that they look at in terms of
saying X piece of evidence helped persuade them on prong one and Y
piece of evidence helped persuade them on prong two. Instead, they
tend to bundle all the evidence into a single discussion and then assert
whether the two-prong test is satisfied (and sometimes they do not
even mention the two-prong test). Given that reality, our inquiry
reports on the evidence that courts look to when confronting CIL,
then tries to back out the question of what pieces are likely to have
impacted the opinio juris determinations.
A. Which Courts?
Historically, the most important court in terms of determinations
of customary international law has been the International Court of
Justice (ICJ). This is the court whose determinations are cited to most
often by scholars and other courts as the key authority in terms of
what CIL is and how it should be determined. We, therefore, collected
all of the cases ever decided by the ICJ that could arguably be said to
have made determinations of CIL. We supplemented those cases with
determinations of the ICJ’s predecessor court, the Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ). In addition, we examined a subset of
decisions from the numerous other international tribunals, such as the
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). We did not
have the resources to collect the decisions of every one of these
secondary international tribunals. Therefore, we tried to limit
ourselves to the most important decisions. We did that by looking to
all cases from these tribunals that were cited in the 2013 report of the
35
International Law Commission’s (ILC) study group on CIL.

35. The ILC is a United Nations appointed committee that is perhaps the most influential
body of experts on international law. For details, see Origin and Background of theDevelopment
and Codification of International Law, INT’L L. COMM’N, http://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcintro.htm (last
visited Jan. 11, 2015).
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To obtain our observations, we searched each database of cases
for all of the judicial opinions that discussed any one of the following
terms: “custom,” “international law,” “customary international law,”
“opinio juris,” “practice,” or “law of nations.” As noted, we
supplemented the list of cases here with the cases mentioned in the
2013 draft of the ILC’s report on CIL. Once cases had been identified,
we examined the portions of the opinions discussing CIL and coded
each determination of CIL for the types of evidence that were
discussed as either rising to the level of CIL or not. Within a single
case that might have multiple CIL issues in it, we coded each issue
separately. If there were dissenting or concurring opinions that were
doing independent analyses of the CIL question, we coded those
separately as well. The goal was to examine a wide array of judicial
determinations so as to try and understand how judges and courts got
around the intractability problem in the traditional definition of CIL.
We encountered a few threshold issues. The first was whether to
code only opinions that concluded that there was CIL or also those
that concluded that CIL was not present. The argument in favor of
limiting the data to cases affirmatively finding CIL is that since we are
interested in examining the type and amount of evidence courts think
is adequate to find CIL, we should limit our analysis to those
instances where CIL was found. The counterargument is that the
types of disputes that end up in court—particularly at the appeals
level or at the level at which states are willing to go to an
international tribunal—will necessarily be those in which the legal
question is a close one. Otherwise, as the research on the economics
of litigation teaches us, the cases would have settled. This approach is
also relevant if one believes that—consistent with a large body of
literature on judicial behavior—factors other than simply the
quantum of evidence can make a difference as to the outcome in close
36
cases.
The second threshold issue was whether to code only cases from
one type of court (the ICJ, for example) or include a variety of types
of courts. On the matter of including multiple courts, including
domestic courts, the argument in favor of limiting the analysis to
international tribunals such as the ICJ is that domestic courts are
often going to be biased towards domestic interests and that,

36. Cf. Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice
Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599 (2005).
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therefore, an examination of their analyses is less valuable. For us, it
would have been interesting to be able to examine a wide range of
domestic tribunals, but resource constraints again kept us focused on
the international tribunals.
B. Which Variables?
In choosing the variables to code for, we began with the standard
rule (extensive practice plus opinio juris) and set forth the types of
evidence that the definition likely contemplated. Next, we did an
initial round of coding of roughly a dozen ICJ cases to look at what
types of evidence they were citing as support for their inquiries. The
combination of those two steps gave us twelve evidentiary variables
to code for. By looking at the kinds of evidence that courts use in
applying the standard CIL rule of evolution, we hope to draw
inferences about how they are tackling the problems posed by the
rule.
The variables fit roughly into four categories. The first category
includes the variables that capture the use of direct evidence
supporting the standard CIL definition. Second are the variables that
capture the degree of delegation of the task of collecting and
analyzing the evidence to third parties, such as treatise writers or
academics. Third are the variables capturing something that is not at
all traditional CIL, but what we will call “aspirational” CIL. Finally,
fourth are the variables that capture what one might call the
procedural elements in the CIL calculus.
1. Direct Evidence Supporting the Standard Definition
State Acts: Part one of the standard definition of CIL tells us to
look for widespread and settled evidence of state practice. The first
variable we coded for, therefore, was evidence of actions by states.
Specifically, assertions along the lines of, “On X date, State Y took Z
action.”
Statements by State Officials: Under the traditional definition of
CIL, states not only have to act, but they also have to believe that
their actions are consistent with international law. That is, opinio juris.
Courts might cite to evidence of statements by state officials
indicating their understanding of certain legal obligations. There
37. Along these lines, see Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application
of International Law: An Analysis of the Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 159
(1993).
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might also be evidence of what other states believe at the time.
2. Evidence of Delegation to Intermediaries
Treatises: Our expectation was that academic treatises would play
an important role in assisting courts with their determinations of CIL.
Assuming that treatise writers seek the fame that comes with being
cited by courts as authoritative, there is an incentive for these writers
to build reputations for credibly reporting and analyzing the historical
evidence that points to or away from a certain set of practices having
evolved towards CIL status.
Academic Articles: The rationale for academic articles constituting
evidence of CIL is the same as with treatises.
Reports of International Committees: Interest groups often have
distinct perspectives on how law should evolve. They, therefore, have
an incentive to try and influence the way in which CIL evolves by
putting together groups of eminent lawyers and scholars to do the
kind of background research work that courts are unable to do.
Examples of the types of bodies that we code for under this variable
include the International Law Association, expert committees put
together by the Red Cross, and various bar association committees.
We code both citations to committee reports and conference reports
under this variable.
Note, though, that we are making substantial assumptions
regarding the content of some of these types of materials. There will
certainly be academic articles and committee reports that are largely
normative, which would perhaps better fit under the next category of
evidence.
3. Evidence of Aspirational CIL
Treaties: The problem with looking solely at the statements of
state officials as evidence of their understanding of the law is that
those officials might be acting strategically in making those
statements. In this context, treaties might provide more credible
evidence of state beliefs. After all, a state that enters into a treaty is
subjecting itself to legal liability. Here, however, we encounter an
issue under the traditional definition of CIL: treaties are good
evidence of what states want the law to be, but they are not
necessarily good evidence of what the law is. After all, the need for a
treaty is likely to arise primarily in the absence of law, not when it is
widespread and well established.
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United Nations (UN) Resolutions: UN resolutions are relevant to
CIL determinations in the same manner that treaties are: they are
indications of what states consider important issues for the
international community. However, like treaties, they are also
problematic as a source of evidence of CIL since it is unlikely that
there would be a need for a UN resolution on topics where there was
already longstanding and widespread agreement on a certain
principle of international law. Along those lines, the presence of a UN
resolution is arguably evidence against the presence of CIL.
UN Conference and Committee Reports: The different organs of
the UN are constantly producing a vast amount of material on issues
of international concern, such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
labor rights, human trafficking, environmental standards, and odious
debts. The level of support from the various nations for these UN
studies or conference reports can range from none at all to
widespread support. At most, this type of evidence suggests that there
are issues of concern. Individual states may support or even fund UN
conferences and reports, but that does not tell us whether the state
supports CIL on the matter. The state may simply be interested in
studying the matter or seeking to placate some minority domestic
constituency.
Statutes—Domestic: Domestic statutes may indicate individual
state preferences as to the future of international law. Or, even if
those preferences vis-à-vis international law have not formed, perhaps
courts could read an aspiration in that direction into them. The link is
not necessarily obvious though. The fact that a state has local
legislation on an issue affecting its citizens does not mean that it takes
the same view regarding the rights or obligations of citizens of other
countries. Both contemporary and historical practice are rife with
examples of how states, particularly the rich ones, have very different
conceptions of what their own citizens are entitled to and what
outsiders to their nations are entitled to. Would one infer, for example,
from the domestic statutes in northern European nations that there is
CIL mandating that a basic level of social support be provided in all
nations and that all other nations are responsible for? Probably not.
Objections aside, we code for the number of statutes cited because
statutes do seem to be cited as support of CIL.
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Statutes—International: Because there is no global legislature
making international law, there can be no international statutes. There
are, however, international treaties that have wide agreement among
states and that are sometimes referred to as “statutes.” We code these
38
separately.
4. Evidence on Procedural or Other Background Matters
Case Law—International Tribunal Cases: Prior cases are not, in
and of themselves, evidence of either state behavior or opinio juris.
That is, unless the argument is made that courts are state actors. And
that argument, given that courts in many jurisdictions are avowedly
not seeking to reflect either the views of the executive or those of the
general public, is a problematic one. Prior court decisions might get
cited, however, because they set precedent in terms of how CIL cases
are to be decided or what kinds of evidence had been considered
relevant in a prior dispute.
Case Law—Domestic Cases: The rationale for using municipal
court decisions as evidence is the same as that for international
tribunal cases.
We recognize that others might disagree with our categorizations
of the variables. For that reason, we report the results on all the
variables individually.
In addition to the foregoing variables, we also coded for
agreements among the parties regarding what the applicable CIL was.
We had not expected this to be a relevant form of evidence, but came
across it in a handful of cases.
In terms of coding the variables, we coded the number of unique
items that were cited in each judicial determination (what we call
observations). If the treaty creating the IMF was cited, we counted
that as one in the treaty column. If, in addition, the treaty
implementing the European Stabilization Mechanism was also cited,
our number of treaties cited tally went up to two. We did not count
the number of times some piece of material was cited, tallying only
whether it was cited.

38. E.g. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/
RomeStatutEng.pdf.
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The final two variables we coded for were case-level controls to
help us determine whether different categories of cases apply CIL
differently.
5. Case-Level Controls
Subject Area: Some scholars have suggested that there are two
different categories of CIL, roughly speaking: traditional CIL and
39
modern CIL. The former emphasizes step one of the textbook
definition—state practice—while the latter emphasizes step two—
opinio juris. Traditional CIL is made up of the rules that have long
governed interstate relationships, such as the rules governing
diplomatic immunities, the conduct of war, and the regulation of ships
in international waters. Here, traditional practices are arguably more
relevant in determining CIL. Then there is modern CIL, which
governs matters that fit more into the category of individual rights,
such as prohibitions on states committing genocide. In these
individual-rights cases, the argument is sometimes made that evidence
of opinio juris is more important than state practice—largely because
longstanding state practices are often inconsistent with the rights
being sought.
For purposes of this inquiry, we have divided cases into those
involving collective interests—more traditional CIL—versus
individual rights—modern CIL. This is to examine whether we see
something different going on in terms of the type of evidence that is
relevant in the different categories of case.
Explicit Use of the Two-Part, Textbook Definition: We have coded
the cases using a generous definition of when the courts might be
determining a CIL rule. It might be argued, therefore, that some of
these determinations that we have coded are no more than exercises
in clarification of the CIL rule and do not call for the courts to
analyze evidence. It strikes us that this is not a particularly meaningful
distinction, since clarification of the CIL rule is essentially a form of
determining whether there is CIL. Still, perhaps cases in which the
judge explicitly says that she is applying the two-part definition are
ones that the judge is more serious about illustrating how the
definition applies. We therefore code the cases for whether they are
ones in which the two-part definition is explicitly invoked.

39. See, e.g., Anthea E. Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757 (2001).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Total Counts
Figure 1 provides a breakdown of the full dataset, in terms of the
pieces of evidence described above. For simplicity, we have combined
some of them. This project began with the inquiry of how much and
what kind of evidence was enough to satisfy the traditional CIL
definition. For example, how many statements from state officials
were being discussed as relevant in each judicial determination with
respect to CIL?
We have numbers on 140 different CIL determinations by
international tribunals. When we began this project to inquire into
how courts determined opinio juris, we expected to primarily find
courts citing to evidence of various government officials making
statements as to what they believed CIL in a particular case to be.
This, after all, would be classic opinio juris, if one could somehow
solve the problem of determining whether the statements were
genuine or strategic. What we see in the data, however, is that there
are only twenty citations to statements by government officials in all
140 determinations. Basically, that means that statements of state
officials are almost never examined.
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Instead, the type of evidence that looks to be the most important
for determinations of CIL is the international treaty. In the 140 CIL
determinations, there were 275 citations to treaties, telling us that
treaties are by far the most important type of evidence in CIL
determinations. After citations to treaties come citations to prior
cases, both domestic and international—what we expect are largely
citations for procedural reasons. As noted earlier, the fact that treaties
are cited at all as evidence of CIL is puzzling if one expects to see the
traditional definition being followed. Treaties, after all, typically are
entered into because there is no existing law and nations need some
law. In other words, they are an indicator of the absence of law, rather
than the presence of it, that is the opposite of opinio juris. Yet here, we
find that not only are treaties cited, but they are the dominant type of
material cited in CIL determinations.
Although most treaties are forward-looking, and the traditional
definition of CIL asks for backward-looking evidence, there are
exceptions to the objection to treaties as evidence for CIL. In the case
of some treaties, for example, the drafters of the treaty might purport
to be doing nothing more than codifying established and consistent
state practice. In those cases, however, one would expect the court in
question to specify that it was citing a treaty because that treaty
40
represented a codification of past state practice and opinio juris. And
this does happen. But it happens rarely. To examine this question, we
took a random subset of fifty of our coded CIL determinations and
examined the question of whether there was any indication on the
part of the judge that the treaty being cited was meant to codify
existing practice. We found such indications in fewer than 20 percent
of the determinations. If one plausibly assumes that the remainder of
the treaties were cited as evidence of what states wanted their laws to
be, then we must conclude that the dominant form of evidence being
41
cited is forward-looking or aspirational.
40. For example, take the following language from a United States domestic case applying
CIL: “Moreover, other courts, international bodies, and scholars have recognized that the
principles set out in the London Charter and applied by the International Military Tribunal are
significant not only because they have garnered broad acceptance, but also because they were
viewed as reflecting and crystallizing preexisting customary international law.” Khulumani v.
Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 271 (2d Cir. 2007).
41. Even if the drafters of the treaty did assert that they were codifying past state practice
and opinio juris, it is not clear that a court, if it were following the traditional definition of CIL,
should be able to assume that what was said by states during the codification process was true.
Among the other complications involved in using treaties as evidence of widespread and settled
state practices is that most treaties have only a subset of states that agree to them, as other
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And it is not just treaties that receive a high degree of attention
from courts in their CIL determinations. Treaties dominate, but three
other forms of evidence that are largely as aspirational in character
also play a big role in CIL determinations. Those are UN Resolutions,
other UN Material such as committee reports and conference reports,
and domestic statutes. Added together, these materials constitute
another significant portion of the material cited to in CIL
determinations. These are also among the more cited materials in CIL
determinations. Treaties by themselves, as Figure 1 shows, have 275
citations in the 140 CIL determinations. Add in the UN materials, UN
committee reports, and state statutes and we have over 350 citations
to this aspirational or forward-looking material. By contrast, there are
fewer than fifty or so citations to material that might directly support
the traditional CIL definition, and here we are talking about not only
opinio juris, but also state practice.
Despite the numbers reported above, one might nevertheless
wonder whether courts, while they are not looking to direct evidence
supporting the traditional definition, are delegating the job of
collecting the evidence and analyzing it to academic scholars. After
all, the role that academic scholars played for a long time—and still
do in some jurisdictions—was to collect evidence and synthesize law.
From the citation count data in Figure 1, we do see that there are
roughly fifty citationsy) to academic articles and treatises. But that is
still only a little more than one cite to an article or treatise every third
CIL determination; not enough to support arguments about
widespread opinio juris.
To recap, based on Figure 1, it looks like courts are neither
pursuing direct evidence fitting the traditional definition nor are they
delegating that task to academics and treatise writers. The vast
majority of the action in CIL cases is occurring on the aspirational or
forward-looking front; little is occurring on the traditional or
backward-looking front. To borrow from Bradley’s article on the
chronological paradox in opinio juris, it looks as if courts are engaged
in a type of common law adjudication–forward-looking adjudication
focused on solving global problems as opposed to some kind of
backward-looking historical aggregation of evidence (something that
courts probably would not have the expertise to do, even if they
states may not have even been invited to participate. For a discussion of some of these
complications, see Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of
Customary International Law, 25 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 71 (1996).
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B. Dealing with Outliers
Most of the determinations that we examined cited to only a
handful of materials. This creates a potential issue with outliers if
there is a subset of cases where the judges cite a lot of materials, while
the vast majority of cases have very few citations. For example,
imagine that there is one opinion that cites to seventy-five treaties
and every other determination only cites to one or two treaties. With a
limited dataset, such as the one we use, that single opinion with the
seventy-five treaties would skew our results.
To correct the problem, we estimate counts of materials being
cited, in individual determinations, by giving a maximum score of 1 if
a particular type of material is cited. So, if judicial determination A
cites to five different treaties, we code that as a 1 as opposed to a 5.
What we get with this coding is the fraction of CIL determinations
that use treaties or direct evidence of state acts and so forth. We end
up undercounting the influence of individual variables here, but we
correct for the problem of outliers. Figure 2 reports these modified
results.
The primary result remains: treaties constitute the dominant form
of evidence used in CIL determinations. Sixty-one percent of the
determinations use at least one treaty as support for their analysis—
and we know from Figure 1 that they probably use more than one. By
contrast, statements of state officials are used in only a small fraction,
6 percent, of determinations. The other forms of aspirational evidence,
as Figure 2 demonstrates, also show up in relatively high fractions of
cases as compared to statements of state officials. UN or League of
Nations Conference Reports and Committee Reports show up in 16
percent of the determinations. UN or League of Nations Resolutions
also show up in 16 percent of the determinations, and other
International Committee Materials show up in 20 percent of the
determinations. The point that emerges from Figure 2, therefore, is
essentially the same as in Figure 1: it is the forward-looking or

42. See Bradley, supra note 21. The type of backward looking analysis that the CIL
definition calls for, if taken seriously, would require courts to be experts in history, economics,
political science, and anthropology, in addition to the expertise in law that we assume they have.
One need only read a few of these CIL opinions to realize that these courts are not
demonstrating those types of expertise or borrowing it from the arguments of the parties.
Rather, they are doing what pragmatic courts do.
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aspirational types of evidence that dominate the determination of
CIL. Judges do look, to some extent, to evidence of past practices. But
for the most part, the inference we draw from the data is that judges
seem to be trying to figure out not what legal norms among states
were in the past and whether they believed they were law, but rather
what states generally believe should be law for their collective.

C. Parsing the Subsets
1. Explicit Mention of the Two-Part Textbook Test
In constructing our dataset of CIL determinations, we painted
with a broad brush. We collected all of the determinations where it
was even arguable that CIL was being determined. One objection to
our analysis, therefore, could be that we are not in fact reporting on
the set of cases where CIL is determined via the classic two-part test.
That subset, it might be argued, is made up solely of the
determinations where the two-part test is explicitly invoked.
To answer this objection, we coded each of our determinations for
whether the two-part test was explicitly invoked. Table 1 shows the
comparison of the types of evidence used in the subset of cases
invoking the two-part test and the types used in the remainder of
cases. Here we report the percentage of times a type of evidence
shows up at least once in a determination, not the raw numbers of
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times the type of evidence shows up. In terms of our key variable,
the use of treaties is higher in the determinations invoking the twopart test, 78 percent of the determinations, than in the other
determinations, 58 percent. In other words, although the difference is
not statistically significant, the primary result regarding the
dominance of aspirational evidence of CIL, and particularly treaties,
holds.
Table I: CIL Determinations With Explicit Mention of the Two-Part
Test
Two-Part Test
Two-Part Test
Variable
Mentioned
Not Mentioned
(n = 23)
(n = 117)
Parties’ Agreement
13
9
UN/League Resolutions
43
10***
UN/League Conference and
17
16
Committee Reports
Domestic Cases
13
11
Domestic Statutes
9
6
International Tribunal Cases
65
36**
International Committee Reports
22
21
Treaties
78
58
Actions by States
0
6
Statements by State Officials
22
3***
Academic
13
17
*** indicates significance at the .01 level, ** indicates significance at the
.05 level and * indicates significance at the .1 level.

3. Cases that Find CIL.
Another possible objection to the numbers in Figure 1 is that
those numbers are from all CIL determinations. Perhaps, as one
colleague argued to us, treaties are only being cited in cases where
CIL claims are being rejected? If we are interested in what types of
evidence are used in determining whether CIL is present, this
colleague argued, we should have focused on the cases where the
tribunal found CIL, as opposed to looking also at the determinations
where CIL was not found.
43. We do this for all three tables. The basic results hold true if one looks at the raw
number breakdowns as well. We choose to report the percentage numbers though, so as to be
able to also report the significance levels (which would not make sense in the case of the raw
numbers).
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To answer the objection, we coded all of our determinations for
whether CIL was found or not. Table 2 reports the results of
comparing the determinations where CIL was found versus those
where it was not. A couple of things are worth noting here. First, CIL
is found in roughly half the determinations and not found in the other
half. That suggests that these cases, when they are brought to an
international tribunal, stand in equipoise—where the litigants have
roughly equal chances of winning. Importantly for our purposes
though, we see that the use of treaties as evidence is greater in the
cases where CIL is found—68 percent of determinations use treaty
evidence—as compared to where CIL is not found, 55 percent. As
with the prior parsing, the differences are not statistically significant
on the use of treaties. The relevant point, though, is that the primary
result holds even when we limit ourselves to the subset of cases where
CIL is found.
Table II: CIL Determinations Broken Down by Whether CIL was
Found
CIL found
CIL not found
Variable
(n = 64)
(n = 76)
Parties’ Agreement
19
3**
UN/League Resolutions
23
9*
UN/League Conference and
14
18
Committee Reports
Domestic Cases
9
13
Domestic Statutes
5
8
International Tribunal Cases
52
32*
International Committee
23
20
Reports
Treaties
69
55
Actions by States
5
5
Statements by State Officials
9
3
Academic
16
17
*** indicates significance at the .01 level, ** indicates significance at the
.05 level and * indicates significance at the .1 level.

3. Subject Area Differentials.
As explained in Part II.B.5, some scholars have suggested that
courts apply the two-part test differently, as a function of the type of
issue involved. The claim is that courts may look more to historical
evidence of state practice and less to opinio juris in the case of
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traditional types of CIL. By contrast, in disputes involving what
scholars describe as modern CIL, courts are likely to look less to
historical evidence and more to opinio juris. At first cut, it is not clear
which box a court would put the IMF priority issue in. On the one
hand, it looks like the type of topic that falls in the traditional box—it
involves state interactions and does not implicate individual rights—
unless one sees creditor rights in that light. On the other hand,
financial interactions among states have not traditionally been
governed by international law, so one might see this as a modern type
of CIL. At this stage of the analysis though, the threshold question is
whether there is any indication in the data that courts treat the
different types of CIL questions differently. If they do not appear to,
then we can put aside the question of whether IMF priority is modern
or traditional CIL.
Fortunately, for our purposes, Table 3 shows little evidence of
courts looking primarily to different types of evidence in individual
rights cases versus those involving intergovernmental interaction
issues. We see that treaties are cited significantly more often in rightstype cases, 83 percent, than in those involving intergovernmental
relations, 54 percent, but the reality is that treaties are the most
important type of evidence cited in either type of case.
Table III: CIL Determinations Broken Down By Subject Type
(Collective Interest v. Individual Rights)
Variable

Collective
Interest
Determinations
(n = 105)
11
15
13

Individual
Rights
Determinations
(n = 35)
6
17
26

Parties’ Agreement
UN/League Resolutions
UN/League Conference and
Committee Reports
Domestic Cases
10
14
Domestic Statutes
4
14*
International Tribunal Cases
37
51
International Committee Reports
17
34*
Treaties
54
83*
Actions by States
7
0
Statements by State Officials
4
11
Academic
13
26
*** indicates significance at the .01 level, ** indicates significance at the
.05 level and * indicates significance at the .1 level.
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To summarize, the results are fairly consistent, no matter how we
parse them. The dominant form of evidence used in determinations of
CIL looks to be forward-looking or aspirational evidence. That is,
primarily treaties among states—which are arguably the strongest
indicator of what states want—but also other forms of aspirational
evidence, such as UN resolutions and international committee reports.
These materials tend to generally focus on questions of what types of
new rules would serve the world community in the future, rather than
analyses of what rules have been utilized in the past. Under this
rubric, the question that jumpstarted our inquiry—whether the IMF
can be said to have a preferred creditor status under CIL—boils down
to whether courts can be persuaded that this would be a good thing
for the community of nations.
IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
There are many strong arguments in favor of the IMF being
granted preferred creditor status when it lends to nations in financial
44
distress. The simplest argument is that this is emergency financing
that is given to a nation when it has lost market access. No one else is
willing to lend and the IMF, reasonably, demands that if it lends at
below-market rates under such conditions, it should be assured that
the IMF will be repaid before the other creditors who lent during the
good times.
The argument in favor of IMF priority strengthens if one
considers the fact that the IMF, by its own rules, can only lend to one
of these nations in crisis when either (1) it is confident that the crisis
in question is a liquidity one rather than a solvency one, that is,
market access has been irrationally withdrawn and will likely return,
or (2) when a failure to support this nation presents a high degree of
45
systemic risk or contagion. The IMF is also not allowed to lend when
a nation is not attempting, in good faith, to resolve its arrears with its
46
prior creditors, the goal here being to protect against the moral
hazard problem of countries defaulting on private creditors too
readily, in the expectation of receiving IMF support. All in all, IMF

44. See, e.g., Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, Preferred Creditor Status under International Law:
The Case of the International Monetary Fund, 39 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 801 (1990).
45. INT’L MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING—RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 48
(2013), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf.
46. See id. (discussing the good faith criterion).
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lending practices are set up with the intent to enhance global welfare.
The objections to the foregoing line of argument are that we have
oversimplified and that IMF lending is rarely as benevolent as we
have portrayed. Instead, it is politically driven by the interests of the
IMF’s largest shareholders and that the conditionality and austerity
that the IMF almost always demands, particularly from weak nations,
has more to do with enabling the expansion of western interests and
47
often ends up worsening the financial crises in question.
For purposes of our analysis, the foregoing normative debate over
the degree to which priority for IMF lending is socially beneficial is
not particularly relevant. What our analysis says is that the type of
evidence courts are most likely to look to is aspirational evidence—
what kind of rule would be good for the system—and that the lack of
evidence of opinio juris is not going to be an absolute bar to a finding
of a CIL doctrine on IMF priority. That said, and assuming that our
preliminary empirical analysis holds up, there are still a number of
objections that critics might raise about our project. Below, we list the
three we have heard most frequently and our answers to them.
A. The IMF Might Not Want Legal Priority
A critic could validly point out that if the IMF had wanted legal
priority, it could have easily negotiated for it in every one of its
contracts. It did not, and perhaps that means the IMF believes that it
is best for it and the international system for it to ensure compliance
48
with its priority via informal pressures rather than formal ones. We
concede that the foregoing is a possibility; indeed, it has been the
status quo until now. But this is where the NML v. Argentina case over
the meaning of pari passu comes into play. If the IMF does not have
formal legal priority over other creditors, then it is pari passu with
everyone else. And under NML v. Argentina, that means that those
other creditors, if they do not get paid on par with the IMF, can come
after the IMF. We are fairly confident that this is not the state of the

47. See, e.g., Kunnibert Raffer, Improving Debt Management on the Basis of UNCTAD’s
Principles, in SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE UNCTAD PRINCIPLES
ON RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN LENDING AND BORROWING 176 (Carlos Esposito, Yuefen Li &
Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky eds., 2013); see also Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Consecuencias jurídicas y
económicas del crédito abusive (Especial referencia al endeudamiento soberano) (2006)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Salamanca).
48. As a formal matter, IMF lending does not generally occur through loan documents as
they are conventionally understood, but through facilities that it already has in place to handle
matters such as balance of payment inequities.
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world that the IMF wants. That said, if we are wrong in reading the tea
leaves, and the IMF is not concerned about the implications of NML
v. Argentina, they do not have to assert the CIL argument that we
suggest they could. If they do not, their status of having no more than
de facto priority will remain, and they will either get out of the
business of providing emergency financing to distressed nations or
they will get sued a lot.
B. All Those Credit Default Swap Contracts That Will be Triggered
The objection that we have heard most often has to do with the
parade of horribles that will follow regarding credit default swap
49
(CDS) contracts. Most sovereign CDS contracts have as one of the
events of default a change in the ranking or priority of the debt.
Holders of these CDS contracts have in the past raised the argument
that IMF lending to a nation in distress, where the IMF had preferred
creditor status, is a change in their ranking, after all, they are now
junior to the IMF in terms of priority. The answer to these CDS
holders thus far has been that the IMF’s preferred creditor status is a
de facto one, not a formal legal one, and that their contracts are
triggered only by a change in formal legal priority. Should a court
state that, as a matter of CIL, the IMF now had formal legal priority
for its lending, would that not bring all those past holders of CDS
contracts who were denied their claims—or did not make them—in
the context of IMF programs for countries like Ireland, Spain,
Portugal and Greece, rushing back in?
The point is a fair one, but there is a legally familiar answer.
Courts do occasionally reinterpret laws in ways that mean that actors
who might not have had a claim some years prior, and therefore did
not bring it, now realize that they may have a claim under the new
legal interpretation. Such reinterpretations, though, do not necessarily
bring a flood of litigation. Statutes of limitations for most contract
claims are generally no more than a few years. Thus, in the context of
the immediate inquiry, many of the claims will likely have expired.
Moreover, given that the IMF has control over when or if it asserts its
CIL claim, it can make sure that it does so strategically to avoid the
greatest possible amount of litigation. Further, it could be argued that
many of the past claims would not be valid because the court would
49. At their core, CDS contracts provide a sort of insurance against certain credit events
such as default. For additional detail in the sovereign context, see Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati,
CDS Zombies, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 347 (2012).
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be saying that CIL on IMF priority has evolved, at this point in time,
from a norm to a law. Past claims arguably were under the old de
facto priority regime and not the new de jure priority regime.
C. No Turning Back
One of the great virtues of CIL is that it evolves, and when
needed, it can evolve quickly. Courts can use it to tackle problems
caused by unexpected shocks to the system, such as the decision in
NML Capital v. Argentina. This is particularly valuable in contexts
such as international law, where lawmaking is otherwise extremely
difficult even if the majority of nations agree on one particular legal
path. A considerable downside of CIL, though, is that once it is
deemed to have evolved from norm to law, reversing course is
extremely difficult. Hence, if it turns out that the IMF successfully
asserts the CIL argument and then realizes, after seeing how it works
for some years, that de jure priority status is causing immense
problems, there is no easy mechanism to reverse course under the
conventional understanding of CIL. Enough nations would basically
have to violate the new CIL, such that a court could look to all of
those violations to say that new CIL had evolved. To that end, the
IMF and its member nations should think hard before they assert that
IMF priority should be deemed to have evolved from de facto to de
50
jure priority.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s October 2012 decision in NML v. Argentina
has caused much consternation in the sovereign debt world. Breathing
life into a formerly catatonic boilerplate contract provision, the court
held that a sovereign cannot pay some bondholders while neglecting
to pay other holders of the same type of bonds—that is, unless clear
legal priority separates those bondholders. De facto preferred
creditor status, like that traditionally enjoyed by Official Sector
institutions such as the IMF, simply no longer cuts it. And without this
preferred status, the IMF may be unable to fulfill its lender-of-lastresort role, which in turn could harm the entire system of
international finance. Irrespective of one’s normative stance regarding
50. Another answer would be to rethink that conventional rule by which CIL, once it
arises, is so very difficult to alter; and there is a view in international law scholarship that
suggests that this should indeed be the case. See Curtis Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing
From International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202 (2010).
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the role of the IMF, this uncertainty is concerning.
CIL may provide a solution to this problem. To see how, one has
to go beyond the conventional CIL doctrine to an analysis of how
courts actually decide CIL matters. We find that courts tend to use
forward-looking evidence when confronting questions of CIL—a far
cry from the state practice/state belief paradigm that dominates the
textbooks. Instead of determining whether the quantum of state
practice and opinio juris merits a finding of CIL, courts appear to
modify the inquiry to whether states would want a particular norm to
be law. Under this conception of CIL, a court could legitimately find
that the traditional and established norm of the IMF having de facto
preferred creditor status has now evolved into a de jure preferred
creditor status. As such, the IMF’s position as a preferred lender may
not be imperiled after all.
Before concluding, we note a handful of caveats to our analysis.
First, our empirical analysis only scratches the surface in terms of
sophistication of analysis and the size of the data analyzed. We only
report simple counts and graphs and have limited the scope of our
inquiry to cases from international tribunals. A critic could point out
that the majority of CIL determinations are by domestic tribunals.
Further, a dispute over IMF priority is most likely to arise in a case in
either English or New York domestic courts rather than the ICJ
because most debt contracts are governed by the laws of those
jurisdictions and because private investors cannot get to the ICJ
unless some state supports their claim. Our hope is that future studies
will look at a larger number of cases and use more sophisticated
empirical tools.
Second, by focusing on the issue of IMF priority and avoiding the
question of whether other Official Sector institutions like the
European Central Bank, The World Bank, the European Investment
Bank and so on are deserving of similar status, we have arguably
ducked the hardest question about Official Sector priority. This is so
for at least two reasons. First, the lending of these institutions is not
quite so clearly “lender of last resort” lending and, therefore, the
argument in favor of priority is not quite as clear. Second, unlike as
with IMF priority, the norm of granting priority to these institutions is
not as well-established.
Third, our primary finding is that treaties are the primary form of
evidence used in determinations of CIL. From there, we extrapolate
that what judges must be doing is looking to treaties for evidence of
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what the global community considers is best for its collective interest.
We think this is the most plausible hypothesis, based on what we
know. But it is but a hypothesis, and others are possible. For example,
there are those who might take a more realist perspective and argue
that judges in all these cases are primarily serving the interests of
51
their individual states and that the two-step CIL test is simply fluff.
Again, a matter worthy of further inquiry.

51. E.g., Melissa Morgan, Customary Avoidance (Jan. 1, 2014) (unpublished draft),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2385277.

